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At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3 April 1964, NATO Secre-
tary-General Dirk Stikker offi  cially announced his intention to resign. US 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, previously informed by Stikker of his deci-
sion, had sent a message to Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, 
British Foreign Secretary Richard A. Butler, and Canadian Prime Minister 
Lester Pearson on 23 March expressing his hope that the European mem-
bers of the alliance could agree on a successor, thus avoiding the delicate 
situation that had arisen in 1961 when Stikker had been selected. On 4 
April, Italian Ambassador to Washington Sergio Fenoaltea informed US 
Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler that Italy was asserting a claim 
to the position. On 21 April, the Italian government offi  cially proposed 
Manlio Brosio, who had been a candidate for the post three years earlier, 
before Stikker was selected. Two days later, Britain proposed Permanent 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Aff airs Sir Harold Caccia. But fol-
lowing further discussions with Italy, the British withdrew their candi-
dacy, and Brosio was elected NATO secretary-general in August 1964. 
He remained in this offi  ce until the end of his diplomatic career in 1971, 
when he was elected to the Italian parliament’s upper house, the Senate, 
for the Liberal Party. 
When Brosio started his new job at the NATO headquarters, he could 
boast of a long and bright diplomatic career that had led him to Moscow, 
London, Washington, and Paris.When he took up his new post in Paris at 
age 67 in 1964, at the end of his diplomatic career, Brosio was fl attered by 
the appointment and fully aware of the crucial importance of the events 
at the time for the future of the alliance. He often seemed preoccupied 
with the notion of being inadequate for the tasks and requirements of his 
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offi  ce, and his diary reveals frequent expressions of this fear.1 As a matter of 
fact, the years under consideration in this chapter were crucial for the life 
of NATO, and it would not have been easy at all for any secretary-general 
of the alliance to manage the changes, to foresee the outcome of processes 
that in many cases were only in their initial phase at the time and, on these 
basis, to establish a program and a plan for action. 
Th e international situation was in fl ux from the beginning of the 1960s. 
In the aftermath of the Cuban and Berlin crises, relations between the US 
and the Soviet Union appeared to be entering a new phase characterized 
by a less direct confrontation. French particular interests, as expressed by 
President Charles de Gaulle, and Germany’s evolving role in the Atlantic 
framework threatened the cohesion of the alliance. Brosio was aware that 
he was ushering in a new phase in the life of NATO and thought that his 
record as secretary-general might depend upon his ability to adapt NATO 
to a new set of political requirements in a rapidly changing world. His role 
was that of an honest broker, Brosio declared during his visit to Washing-
ton in September 1964 – his fi rst after being designated NATO secretary-
general, and essentially an introductory call. He favored close political 
consultation within NATO on all issues, and stressed that he wanted to 
see NATO arrive at coordinated policies on world issues.2 
In the mid-1960s, Brosio regarded NATO as an organization that had 
to face up to many challenges of internal and external nature. He was per-
sonally convinced that the most dangerous threats to the continuity of the 
alliance came from the inside of the Atlantic body and were constituted 
by the French policy on the one hand and by the US policy of détente 
on the other, both of which were leading to the split of the alliance. For 
the NATO secretary-general, these two dangers were facets of the same 
problem and had to be analyzed together. 
Th is chapter will focus on Brosio’s perception of these dangers and will 
be essentially based on his diaries. Brosio kept a regular journal from 1947 
to 1972. Th is journal – bequeathed after his death to the archives of the 
 See e.g. Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino (TFE), Manlio Brosio Collection (MB), diary XX, 
 February  –  June  (XX), notes for  April .
 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), –, Vol. XIII, no. , “Circular Airgram 
from the Department of State to Certain Missions”, Washington,  October . 
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Luigi Einaudi Foundation in Turin – represents a source of great academic 
interest, as it provides historians with a record of the author’s most private 
opinions3 – those that he could not or did not want to express aloud – and 
sometimes tasty tidbits of information from behind the scenes.4 
The French Danger
Brosio’s principal preoccupation during the fi rst months of his charge 
as secretary-general of the alliance was with the French attitude toward 
NATO. On 5 September 1964, during a 50-minute “relaxed, courteous and 
calm discussion” with Brosio, de Gaulle laid out his views: NATO needed 
suffi  cient forces to fi ght the Soviet Union in case the Warsaw Pact decided 
to attack in Europe; France opposed NATO as an organization, since its 
object was the integration of national eff orts, which France opposed; and 
NATO was no longer necessary because the US was not the only Western 
power with nuclear capability. Brosio asked de Gaulle how the NATO 
treaty might be revised, but de Gaulle replied that such suggestions would 
be useless, since the US would be “diabolically opposed to his ideas” and 
nothing would come of the discussion. De Gaulle asserted that the US was 
no longer interested in Europe, as its main focus had shifted to the Pacifi c, 
and that the US would not come to the assistance of Europe if attacked 
by Soviets. Although de Gaulle did not say so specifi cally, Brosio got the 
impression that France would withdraw from the treaty in 1969.5 
In the opinion of the US Ambassador to France Charles Bohlen – who 
wrote William Tyler a letter on this subject – Brosio was wrong in his 
impression that de Gaulle was seriously thinking of reneging on the NATO 
treaty, as the latter had always made a very defi nite distinction between 
the treaty establishing the alliance and the structure of the organization 
itself. Nevertheless, Bohlen began “to wonder how long we should remain 
 I should like to express my gratitude to the trustees and the secretary of the Einaudi Foundation. 
Without their invaluable help, my work would not have been possible. 
 Th e journal is unpublished. Fausto Bacchetti, a close collaborator of Brosio’s, has edited the 
journal covering Brosio’s time at the Italian embassy in Moscow (Manlio Brosio, Diari di Mosca 
1947–1951, ed. Fausto Bacchetti, Bologna: Il Mulino, ), but the transcription is incomplete. 
I intend to edit an English version of the journal covering the period when Brosio was NATO 
secretary-general. 
 FRUS, –, Vol. XIII, doc. , fn. .
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quiescent in the face of de Gaulle’s gratuitous interpretation of American 
policy”.6 In his response to Bohlen’s letter, Tyler, who had just heard the 
same argument from people at the NATO Parliamentarians conference in 
Washington, pointed out the opportunity to work out some plan to reas-
sure Europeans about the US commitment to the continent, but without 
making specifi c reference to de Gaulle.7 
In Brosio’s view, the major points of de Gaulle’s position were the fol-
lowing: De Gaulle thought that although the threat had diminished, the 
alliance was still necessary; he remained adamantly opposed to the alli-
ance, while refusing to suggest changes to the treaty or the organization; 
furthermore, he stressed European unity as a key factor; he persisted in his 
opposition to any change in NATO strategy, doubting that the US would 
use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe; and fi nally, he continued to be 
concerned about the eff ect of political events in the rest of the world on 
the alliance. In Brosio’s opinion, de Gaulle would not do anything for the 
time being, but in 1969 might well denounce the treaty. Th is suggested an 
urgent necessity for the alliance members to act in advance if they wanted 
to forestall events in 1969. It was necessary to get the French to say what 
they wanted through an initial proposal that would prompt the French side 
to express their views. Th ere was no point in making proposals to change 
the organization until after the German elections in 1965, but Brosio sug-
gestions should be fi elded from 1966 on.8 
In a conversation on 13 May 1965 with US Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, Brosio, referring to Ball’s suggestions for more intensive study of 
the state of the alliance, asked how urgently the US viewed the French 
problem. Rusk explained that in December 1964 de Gaulle had said that 
France would make a proposal for a reorganization of the alliance, probably 
in 1967, but he now had the impression that the French might progress 
more quickly. Th e question, in Rusk’s opinion, was whether it was prefer-
able to wait and see what de Gaulle suggested, or try to establish what the 
 Ibid., doc. , Letter from the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Aff aire (Tyler), Paris,  September .
 Ibid., fn. , p. . 
 Ibid., doc. , Circular Airgram from the Department of State to Certain Missions, 
Washington,  October :NATO Secretary-General Brosio’s Visit, September –.
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remaining members wanted. In the meantime, Rusk stressed that the US 
had to be prepared for “serious” French surprises: the US did not want to 
push for far-reaching, reckless, or fundamental discussions, but did want 
to begin preparations where possible. Brosio declared that he and Rusk 
had the same approach, and agreed that it was desirable to prepare the 
ground in order to cope with de Gaulle’s demarches.9
Relations between France and NATO were an important issue in 
the discussions Brosio had in October 1965 during the second visit to 
Washington. In contrast to the previous visit in October 1964, this was a 
“working” visit. Brosio met with the secretaries of state and defense, and 
he also met with other administration offi  cials, including Under Secretary 
Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for European Aff airs John Leddy. He 
also stopped briefl y at the president’s offi  ce to exchange greetings after a 
talk with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. As far as French-
NATO relations were concerned, Brosio said he felt the French attitude had 
changed recently. It had been generally known that the French were ready 
to stay in the alliance, although they were dissatisfi ed with the organization. 
His impression was that France had now turned towards the Soviets. Th e 
secretary-general declared that he was uncertain as to whether the French 
overtures towards the Soviets were meant to put pressure on the Germans, 
or actually constituted the fi rst step towards uniting Europe “from the 
Atlantic to the Urals”. Brosio said the alliance could not wait for France, 
but had to move forward where possible.
In conversations with Leddy and Ball, Brosio appeared worried that 
the French would try to restrict discussions on US-French diff erences over 
NATO to the bilateral channel. It was made clear to him that the US con-
sidered this to be a problem between France and the other NATO members, 
and not solely a bilateral issue. When the French made their proposals, 
the US government would want to consult other NATO members at an 
early stage and work out with them how to handle the problem. Brosio 
was assured there would have to be intensive consultation between the US 
government and the allies before any moves could be undertaken. He was 
 Ibid., doc. , telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, London,  
May .
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glad to note that the US position remained that Washington would try 
not to provoke a confrontation with the French, but was planning for all 
contingencies. Brosio was told that Washington was ready to wait until 
the French wished to make suggestions, and would continue to press the 
French to come forward with their ideas.10 What mattered most to Bro-
sio was that the France-NATO problem was regarded as a problem of the 
whole alliance, and not as a US–French one. In a conversation with Rusk, 
he emphasized the need for close study regarding procedural aspects of the 
question, in order to avoid an approach that might isolate France11.
On 7 March 1966, President de Gaulle made his long awaited demarche 
to NATO.12 He informed President Johnson that France was removing 
its forces from the NATO integrated command and that all foreign forces 
and installations in France would be placed under French command.13 A 
March 11 aide-mémoire fi lled in the specifi cs of the French proposal.14 De 
Gaulle’s political motivation was elusive, but it was clear that the French 
president was aiming for a fundamental change in France’s relationship 
with NATO. Nevertheless, the fact that the US had decided to reply to 
 Ibid., doc. , Circular Airgram from the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO 
Capitals, NATO Secretary-General Brosio’s Visit, – October , Washington,  October 
.
 Ibid., doc. , telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, Paris,  
December .
 On the French decision, see Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du Général de 
Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Frédéric Bozo, La France et l’OTAN: de la guerre 
froide au nouvel ordre européen (Paris: Masson, 1991); id., Deux Stratégies pour l’Europe: de 
Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’Alliance atlantique (1958–1969) (Paris: Plon, 1996); Maurice Vaïsse, 
Pierre Mélandri and Frédéric Bozo (eds.), La France et l’OTAN 1949–1996, (Paris: Complexe, 
1996); Robert Paxton and Nicholas Wahl (eds.), De Gaulle and the United States (Oxford: Berg, 
1994); Frédéric Bozo, “De Gaulle, l’Amérique et l’Alliance atlantique: une relecture de la crise 
de 1966”, Vingtième siècle no. 43 (1994), pp. 55–68; Samuel F. Wells Jr., “Charles de Gaulle 
and the French Withdrawal from NATO’s Integrated Command”, in American Historians and 
the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1991), pp. 
81–94; Georges-Henri Soutou, “La décision française de quitter le commandement intégré de 
l’OTAN”, in Von Truman bis Harmel: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von 
NATO und europäischer Integration, ed. Hans-Joachim Harder (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 
pp. 185–208. 
 FRUS, –, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Letter from de Gaulle to Johnson, doc. 
,  March .
 Ibid., doc. , Aide-mémoire from the French government to the US government,  March 
.
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the French demarche with a personal letter from Johnson to de Gaulle15 
made Brosio “furious”: evidently, contrary to the assurances Brosio had 
received, Washington was dealing with the French problem on a bilateral 
basis and intended to “act unilaterally”.16
Brosio believed that the US and the British policy of détente was weak-
ening NATO and was partially responsible for the French policy toward 
the alliance. In the spring of 1966, only days before the French announced 
their withdrawal from the integrated military structure of the alliance, he 
noted that “it was necessary to recognize that France had a special status in 
the alliance and that Great Britain and the US had no right to be intran-
sigent with de Gaulle and to accuse France of weakening the alliance, as 
they, too, by their policy of détente, were working for its weakening”.17 In 
Brosio’s views, de Gaulle’s decision was extremely dangerous, since it gave 
Washington and London the opportunity to take advantage of the French 
departure from the NATO military command structure to strengthen their 
control over the alliance. For the secretary-general of NATO, the “mortal 
sin” of the French government lay in this inevitable consequence.18 
On the same day that the French withdrawal from NATO’s military 
structure was offi  cially announced, Brosio noted that “it was necessary not 
to push France to withdraw from the political framework of the alliance”.19 
His fi rst concern was always to avoid any actions or statements that could 
be perceived as urging France to leave the alliance . If the question was to 
adopt a strong attitude and to prepare a showdown with France, he noted, 
it was not up to him to take the responsibility of this decision and of its 
foreseeable consequences. As a matter of fact, he was strongly convinced 
that a brutal confrontation with Paris could not be taken, and, above all, 
that it would not be productive. For the secretary-general, the only viable 
alternative to “the showdown and the refusal to negotiate” was “a negotia-
tion to be started immediately, but to be pursued with a post-de Gaulle 
France” in the hope that de Gaulle’s successor would prove more amenable. 
Brosio was convinced that the fi rst option was impracticable and that the 
 Ibid., doc. .
 TFE, MB, XX,  February  –  June , note for  March .
 TFE, MB, XX, note for  March .
 Ibid.,  March .
 Ibid.,  March . 
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second option off ered a great opportunity “to gain time”, the only problem 
with it being “to set up the negotiation and prepare it well”.20 
Brosio was also forced to consider the practical consequences of the 
French departure from the NATO military command structure: the 
organization had to make arrangements to move NATO headquarters out 
of France; to reach an agreement on the compensation that member states 
would receive for removing their forces and transferring their installations 
out of the country; to fi nd a solution to the future of French troops stationed 
in West Germany under NATO auspices: in other words, NATO had to 
be rebuilt outside of France, and without the participation of France, as 
quickly as possible.21
When Brosio visited Washington for informal discussions in Novem-
ber 1966, he commented in general terms on French policy. He expressed 
his personal view that French policy was incompatible with the spirit of the 
alliance on two fundamental points. Th ese were the French interpretation 
of Article V of the Treaty, and de Gaulle’s concept of Europe “from the 
Atlantic to the Urals”, which implied an inclusion of the USSR in Europe 
and an exclusion of the US from European aff airs. He nevertheless stressed 
the view that it would be unwise and dangerous to force a showdown on 
this point, and that the wiser course was a pragmatic approach.22 
 
The US Danger
For the safety of the alliance, Brosio regarded the US policy of détente, 
with its attempts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union to stop 
nuclear proliferation, as even more dangerous than the French initiative 
He thought that “in this way, the Americans revealed their aim to reduce 
NATO to a simple instrument of their own policy of détente, which would 
fi nally lead to a bilateral dialog between the superpowers behind the back 
of the European countries”.23
 Ibid.,  April .
 Ibid.,  April .
 FRUS, –, XIII, doc. , Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts 
in the NATO Capitals, “Brosio Visit to Washington”,  November .
 TFE, MB, XX,  April .
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According to Brosio’s perception of the events, therefore, the Atlantic 
alliance was being disrupted by both the French the US policies, which 
were simultaneously identical and opposite in nature.24 Th is pessimistic 
view was reinforced by Brosio’s acknowledgement of his narrow room for 
maneuver as secretary-general of the alliance. “I can do nothing”, he wrote. 
“In the very moment of crisis”, he bitterly added, “my function is that of a 
walk-on, with no authority and no power”.25 In an alliance where US and 
British infl uence was increasing thanks to the French withdrawal from its 
military structures, Brosio had to recognize that on vital issues, such as 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the development of US policies 
towards the Soviet Union and Germany, his views diverged widely from 
those of the US.26 
Such a situation left Brosio very little room for a personal strategy in 
a moment where the existence of the alliance seemed to be at stake. He 
sharply condemned the US policy of détente. It was clear to him that the 
price that Washington was ready to pay for a compromise with Moscow 
was to deprive West Germany of any access to nuclear weapons: it meant 
that the US was giving up the idea of changing the European situation and 
was in favor of what Brosio called “a return to Potsdam”.27 In this perspec-
tive, the battle for détente was dangerous: it might arouse West German 
suspicions towards Atlantic policy as a whole, and, by leaving Bonn aside, 
 On the European policy of the Johnson administration, see Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon 
Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003); Massimiliano Guderzo, Interesse nazionale e resposabilità globale: Gli Stati Uniti, l’alleanza 
atlantica e l’integrazione europea negli anni di Johnson 1963–1969 (Florence: Il Maestrale, 2000). 
More generally, on the foreign policy of the Johnson administration, see Diane B. Kunz (ed.), 
The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960’s (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994); H.W. Brands (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Lyndon Johnson: 
Beyond Vietnam (College Station: Texas University Press, 1999); Robert A. Divine (ed.), The 
Johnson Years, in particular vol. III, LBJ at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1994); Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), Lyndon Johnson Confronts 
the World: American Foreign Policy 1963–1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); Robert Dallek, Flawed Giants: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York 
-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 TFE, MB, XX,  April .
 Ibid.,  April .
 Ibid.
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it would fi nally give the Soviets victory in the struggle over Germany that 
had begun in 1945.28 
Brosio did not oppose the principle of détente per se: he opposed the 
form and the content that the US was giving it and did not trust the Soviet 
willingness to reach an agreement with the Western bloc as a whole. In 
Brosio’s opinion, détente had to be one of the instruments in the Western 
political arsenal to promote a progressive liberation of Eastern Europe from 
Soviet control. He thought it was important for NATO to have an active 
role in shaping the course of East-West relations. Otherwise, individual 
members would tend to follow their own path vis-à-vis the Soviets. In his 
opinion, the only protection against Soviet attempts to exploit diff erences 
among the members lay in a growing role for NATO as a center for consul-
tation, for the exchange of information, and for coordination of positions.29 
As far as the German question was concerned, Brosio thought that no one 
could seriously believe that a compromise with Moscow was the best way 
to resolve the division of the country:30 Any meaningful rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union had to be achieved in the context of the German 
problem.31 In this perspective, “while NATO powers should do what was 
possible to improve the atmosphere in relations with Eastern Europe and 
USSR, NATO work on matters of interest of Germany should parallel 
further progress on détente”: Brosio considered this “absolutely essential 
for stability of Europe and Atlantic area”.32
Brosio interpreted Washington’s eagerness to reach an agreement with 
Moscow on nuclear matters as being due to the growing involvement of 
the US in Vietnam and the need to reach an honorable settlement of 
the confl ict.33 In his diary, Brosio was extremely clear on this point. He 
 TFE, MB, XXI –  July  –  May , note  October .
 FRUS, –, XIII, doc. n. , NATO Secretary General Brosio’s Visit, September -, 
.
 TFE, MB, XXI,  November .
 FRUS, –, XIII, doc. n. , NATO Secretary General Brosio’s Visit, September -, 
.
 Ibid., doc. n. , Brosio Visit to Washington,  November .
 On the role the Vietnam war played in the Atlantic relationships see Lawrence S. Kaplan, 
“Th e Vietnam War and Europe: Th e view from NATO”, in La guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe, 
–, ed. Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse (Bruxelles-Paris: Bruylant – LGDJ, 
), pp. –.
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regarded the NPT negotiations as heralding the end of a long historical 
phase when cooperation between the Western allies and the creation and 
the strengthening of the Atlantic structures had been the top priorities 
of US foreign policy. Now the US wanted the Soviets to convince North 
Vietnam to enter negotiations for a settlement of the Asian confl ict34 and, 
in order to secure the help of the Soviet Union, Washington was ready 
to abandon the tenets of its previous European policy and to sacrifi ce its 
Atlantic allies. In other words, Brosio regarded détente as a game between 
two players that started with a classical do ut des: the Soviets would commit 
themselves to bringing Hanoi to the negotiation table, and Washington 
would repay the Soviet cooperation with a – not so “agonizing” – reap-
praisal of its European and Atlantic policy. 
Brosio repeatedly tried to warn Washington about the dangers of such a 
strategy. In February 1966, he told Rusk that the Soviet Union had no real 
intention to help the US to fi nd a settlement to the confl ict in Vietnam; 
Moscow wanted the NPT in order to weaken Germany.35 In November 
1966, during a conversation with Leddy, he went so far as to state that 
an “indiscriminate policy of détente” was incompatible with Germany 
remaining in the Atlantic alliance.36 In his interpretation of the intercon-
nections between the Vietnam war, détente, the NPT, and a settlement for 
the Europeancontinent, Brosio was not alone. He agreed with the Italian 
ambassador in Washington, Sergio Fenoaltea, who thought that “the real 
danger was that the Soviets would concede a honorable peace in Asia that 
would be paid in Europe”37 and with those who, in Italy, were denouncing 
the risk that the US would abandon Europe in favor of Asia.38 In Brosio’s 
words, the NPT was “the counterpart of the exchange”. 
As a matter of fact, a compromise on nuclear matters that would 
impose a freeze on the arms race in Europe would be perceived by the 
Soviet Union as “an American concession against Germany and against 
 On the Soviet Policy in Vietnam see Ilia V. Gaiduk, Th e Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, ).
 TFE, ME, XX,  February .
 TFE, ME, XXI,  November .
 Ibid.,  November .
 Ibid.,  January .
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the possibility of a strong Europe”39 as well as a demonstration of the real 
US commitment to work for an improvement of its relations with Moscow 
and disengage from Europe. For these reasons, the NPT would mark a 
turning point from several points of view: as far as the US policy towards 
Western Europe was concerned, it would represent a watershed between 
two eras. Th e fi rst of these phases, according to Brosio, was characterized 
by the perception that the status quo had to be modifi ed sooner or later; 
the second phase, inaugurated by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, was 
marked by the fundamental acknowledgment of this perception. As far 
as the form and the structure of East–West relations were concerned, the 
NPT would represent the defi nite end of the period when confrontation 
pitted the two blocs against each other and the beginning of a new phase 
dominated by dialog between the superpowers over the interests of the 
junior partners of the respective alliances.40 
The Harmel Exercise: Wishful Thinking?
In November 1966, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, recalling the 
initiative taken by Canada in December 1964, proposed a study on the 
future of the alliance. At the December 1966 Ministerial Meeting, this 
proposal was accepted.41 In US opinion, the aim of the study had to be “to 
articulate up-to-date role for the alliance; to assure its continued relevance 
to improved East–West relations and, against background of French with-
drawal and approach of 1969, to assure continued governmental and public 
 Ibid.
 TFE, MB, XXI,  November .
 In a “scope paper” prepared for the – December  NATO Ministerial meeting, the 
Department of State stressed that the US objectives at the meeting would be: “a) to present 
the picture of an Organization and of an alliance which has surmounted its crisis with France 
but which will be continue to accept French cooperation to the extent this does not damage 
essential NATO interests; b) to demonstrate that the fourteen are going ahead in a business-
like manner, modernizing NATO to meet their need – in the defence structure, in the nuclear 
fi eld and in the area of communications and crisis consultations as well as in the non-military 
fi elds; c) to demonstrate that, in spite of a reduced probability of war in Europe, the nature of 
the Soviet threat calls for an eff ective NATO; d) to evidence that a strong alliance is an essential 
prerequisite to the attainment of a genuine détente and an equitable settlement in Europe; e) 
to support European eff orts to study the future organization and activities of NATO”, FRUS, 
–, vol. XIII, doc. , Scope Paper, Washington,  December .
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understanding and support for goals of Western cohesion and deterrent 
strength of Alliance”.42
When Harmel’s ideas began to circulate in November, Brosio consid-
ered such a proposal an “illusion” because, he noted, there was no agree-
ment about its ultimate political aims.43 Harmel presented his proposal 
as an instrument to react to the French decision, and the US thought it 
was a good idea, as it would mark the distance between France and the 
rest of the alliance. Brosio, however, was convinced that the whole initia-
tive could be used fi rst of all as a means to prevent West Germany from 
exploring the possibility of a direct agreement with the Soviet Union.44 In 
his opinion, the US and French policies of détente were creating a sense of 
isolation and abandonment in Bonn that was pushing West Germany to 
seek a bilateral dialog with Moscow. Th is process represented, for Brosio, 
a major risk for the alliance.
Only after a crucial meeting with the permanent representative of the 
US to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, and the Belgian representative, André 
de Staercke, on 8 December 1966 did Brosio realize that the Belgian initia-
tive was much more important than he had initially thought. Brosio and 
Cleveland agreed that the study on East–West relations would save time 
and, consequently, could help avoid an immediate crisis with France and 
 Ibid., doc. , Telegram from the Department of State to the US embassy in Belgium, 
Washington,  November . Th e proposal was in line with the opinion expressed by US 
President Johnson some weeks before. On  October , Johnson addressed the National 
Conference of Editorial Writers in New York. In commenting the European situation, Johnson 
stressed that the US and its European allies had to move ahead on three fronts: “First, to 
modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances; second, to further the integration of 
the Western community; third, to quicken progress in East–West relations”. Ibid., doc. . 
 On the Harmel Exercise, see the NATO documentation in Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist 
(eds.), The Future Tasks of the Alliance: NATO’s Harmel Report, 1966/67, at http://www.isn.
ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_Harmel.htm. Cf. Andreas Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: 
NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, –”, Journal of Cold 
War Studies, , no.  (), pp. –; Helga Haftendorn, “Entstehung und Bedeutung des 
Harmel-Berichts der NATO von ”, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. , no. (April 
), pp. -; ead., “Th e Adaptation of the NATO Alliance for a Period of Détente: 
Th e  Harmel Report”, in Crises and Compromises: Th e European Project, –, ed. 
Winfried Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, ). On the French attitude, see Frédéric Bozo, 
“Détente vs. Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report -
”, Contemporary European History , no.  (November ), pp. –.
  TFE, MB, XXI,  December .
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Germany.45 Nevertheless, Brosio was bitterly sarcastic when de Staercke 
explained to him that the idea was to promote “an institutional and func-
tional discussion on the status of the alliance” and that the crucial ques-
tions concerned East-West relations and “what mission was to be found 
for NATO”. Th e NATO secretary-general commented in his journal: “As 
if it needed to be found.”46 
In Brosio’s opinion, the success of the initiative depended upon the 
policy that France and Germany would adopt towards the Soviet Union 
and towards Europe as a whole. But de Gaulle, after his visit to Moscow 
from 20 June to 1 July 1966, had openly spoken of a “pan-Europe” and called 
for a Franco-Soviet agreement over Europe: this was, for Brosio, “the most 
anti-European, anti-Atlantic, anti-liberal, and authoritarian language” that 
France could speak. Th erefore, as far as France was concerned, “Harmel’s 
dream” had no perspective. As for West Germany, nothing could be said, 
since the chance of a German policy of direct agreement with Moscow 
remained, at that time, “a political unknown”.47
In mid-December 1966, on the eve of the NATO ministerial meeting, 
Brosio, accompanied by Fausto Bacchetti (of NATO International Staff ), 
met with Secretary of State Rusk. Rusk made some suggestions concern-
ing the Harmel proposal, but Brosio did not reply. Perhaps he did not 
want to be insincere or express his perplexity. At the very moment when 
the Harmel proposal was discussed in the NATO Council, Brosio was in 
fact very severe in his comments on the whole initiative. “Th is proposal 
is crackbrained,” he sarcastically noted. “It aims to solve the crisis of the 
alliance, but in fact it will end up worsening it,” Brosio believed, since the 
starting point of the study was a refl ection on the necessity of the alliance, 
and this, a contrario, seemed to implicitly legitimate potential doubts in 
this respect.48 If its purpose was to indicate the present and the future 
tasks of the alliance in a spirit of détente, in order to fi nd a solution for 
the German question, Brosio believed that détente would win “no com-
pensation from the enemy”, and that no solution could be foreseen for 
 Ibid.,  December .
 Ibid.,  December .
 Ibid.,  December .
 Ibid.,  December .
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West Germany, at least for the present.49 In this perspective, the Harmel 
proposal risked bringing about a renovation of NATO where the alliance 
would maintain its “shell”, but would lose its “essence”.50 
At the December 1966 ministerial meeting, the Council “resolved to 
undertake a broad analysis of international developments since the signing 
of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its purpose would be to determine 
the infl uence of such developments on the alliance and to identify the 
tasks that lie before it, in order to strengthen the alliance as a factor for 
a durable peace”.51 A few days later, at the end of the year, when he tried 
to take stock of the turbulent events of 1966, Brosio was confused: “We 
were able to save the life of NATO this year, but did we really rescue its 
mission and its functions? I don’t know. Th e maintenance of a balance of 
power in Europe is necessary and in order to keep it, the participation of 
the US is necessary, since the idea of a French–Soviet agreement on the 
control of Europe is sheer madness.”52 Would the Harmel Exercise help 
in the solution of NATO’s crisis? Brosio was pessimistic. Th e only advan-
tages of “the sea of papers and reports” in which the Harmel proposal was 
condemned to drown were, on the one hand, the possibility of “saving 
time” in view of the fi nal showdown with France, and on the other, on a 
more personal note, the fact that it would allow him “not to lose ground” 
in view of the growing US control of the alliance.53 Nevertheless, as far as 
the core problems of the alliance were concerned, “no one believes in the 
present mission of NATO, and no one can say what the nature of the new 
mission will be,”54 as the roots of the political meaning of the alliance were 
themselves under discussion.55
Agreement was quickly reached on the procedure for the Harmel Exer-
cise but, for Brosio, this in itself could not justify optimistic expectations 
for the future: on 13 January 1967, in a meeting with Cleveland and de 
 Ibid.
 Ibid.
 Th e Harmel Report: Full Reports by the Rapporteurs on the Future Tasks of the Alliance at http://
www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel.htm.
 TFE, MB, XXI, – December .
 Ibid.,  December .
 Ibid.,  January .
 Ibid.,  February .
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Staercke, Brosio reaffi  rmed that the fi rst priority was to know “what we 
want.”56 His sharply critical attitude was probably perceived by his collabo-
rators: he noted that de Staercke wanted to leave him out of the study as 
– Brosio argued – “he evidently feared I could torpedo the initiative.”57 
At the December 1966 ministerial meeting, it had been decided that 
a preliminary report would be examined at the ministerial meeting in the 
spring of 1967. Th en the ministerial Council, at its meeting in December 
1967, would draw the appropriate conclusions from the enquiry. It had 
also been decided that a special group of representatives designated by the 
member governments would be established under the chairmanship of the 
secretary-general. Th is Special Group was set up on 22 February 1967 by 
the permanent Council. 
In view of the preliminary discussion scheduled for 6 March, Brosio 
met Cleveland and de Staercke on 3 March for an exchange of opinions 
about the procedure and the content of the study. Th ey agreed that it 
would not make sense to go on with the creation of the sub-groups and 
the designation of the rapporteurs unless the political purpose of the study 
had previously been determined. “Obviously,” Brosio noted, “this raises 
great questions” about Soviet foreign policy, the signifi cance of détente and 
the objectives of the East–West contacts as well as about the principle of 
consultation and its constraints.58 Th ese were diffi  cult problems, Brosio 
remarked, but if these questions could not be answered, the whole process 
might turn out to be only “a technical exercise”.59 
After the meetings of 6 and 14 March 1967, he had the impression 
that this danger was becoming real: no one seemed to be willing to face a 
serious discussion about the political problems of the alliance60 and about 
the coordination of the policy of détente.61 In Brosio’s opinion, détente 
remained a “political mirage”: it was no more than “a word, a smoke”, he 
noted, but it was the only compensation that Washington would receive 
from the Soviets in exchange for the NPT, which would lead to the break-up 
 Ibid.,  January .
 Ibid.,  March .
 Ibid.,  March .
 Ibid.,  February .
 Ibid.,  March .
 Ibid.,  April .
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of the alliance.62 He noted that the context was marked by the intercon-
nection of several elements: the change of priorities in US foreign policy; 
the wish to avoid an immediate showdown with France; the agony of the 
alliance itself because of the French and US policies towards Moscow, both 
pursued behind the back of Germans and both aiming to establish a new 
framework to control Germany;63 the concern to reassure Bonn and pre-
vent an unilateral German policy of détente: in this context, the Harmel 
exercise was, in Brosio’s opinion, no more than “an exercise in futility”64 
amid growing pressure to show Western public opinion that NATO was 
still alive and necessary. 
In April 1967, the Special Group established four sub-groups, each 
working on a broad subject of interest to the alliance: East-West Relations; 
interallied relations; general defense policy; and relations with other coun-
tries. Th e rapporteurs for the respective member states were the English-
man J.H.A.Watson and the German Klaus Schütz for the fi rst sub-group; 
the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak for the second one; US representative Foy 
Kohler for the third one, and Dutchman C.L. Patijn for the fourth sub-
group.65 Th eir work started on 17 April 1967. 
Brosio’s original skepticism about the relevance of the initiative was 
confi rmed as the work of the four sub-groups progressed. As the chair-
man of the Special Group, he had been regularly reading their documents 
and considered them “indefi nite and vague”: “they pointed out the most 
diffi  cult problems,” he noted, “but no one has any ideas about the means 
to solve them.”66
Th e Six-Day War in June 1967 opened new divergences between 
NATO’s offi  cial pro-Israeli line and the pro-Arab policy expressed by 
France. Th is rift added a new element to Brosio’s pessimism, confi rming his 
doubts about the Soviet interpretation of détente and about the solidity of 
the Atlantic alliance. First of all, it made clear that the NATO partners were 
far from being unanimous as to the strategy to be adopted in the Middle 
 Ibid.,  March .
 TFE, MB, XXII,  May  –  March , note for  July .
 TFE, MB, XXI,  April .
 Th e Future Tasks of the Alliance, Press release,  April , http://www.nato.int/docu/pr//
p-e.htm.
 TFE, MB, XXI,  May  and XXII,  August .
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East: the French and the US, he noted, “are more or less in favor of the 
Arabs, but the French aim to precede the Americans in order to play a role 
as peace-makers together with the Soviets, leaving the Americans aside.”67 
It also showed that clarifi cation was required as to the form and content 
of “détente” and, last but not least, that the Atlantic alliance was unable 
to play any major role in the international system.68 On this occasion, 
Brosio wrote, the only concern of the NATO Council was to show that it 
was active and that the alliance was still alive, but, as bitterly remarked, it 
was nothing more than an action “going nowhere”.69
Th e centrality of the French question became apparent at the very 
beginning of the Harmel Exercise. In Brosio’s opinion, if the study was 
meant to be of any signifi cance, it should establish the parameters of a 
common policy “be it of détente, of negotiation or of fi rmness” towards 
Moscow. Th e problem was that France was opposed to even the principle 
of an Atlantic common policy. If this was true – and it was – all the dan-
gers that Brosio had foreseen since the launching of the Belgian proposal 
seemed certain to be confi rmed: either the reports would omit to mention 
the French position, and the exercise as a whole would be considered a 
failure; or they would increase the risk of a showdown with France. Bro-
sio wondered whether it was convenient to give France this opportunity. 
Would France exploit the situation to mark its distance from the fourteen 
other members and leave the alliance? Was this the opportunity France 
had been looking for to justify the decision to abandon the Atlantic frame-
work?70 As 1969 was approaching, the risk of a French repudiation of the 
treaty grew: it was impossible to exclude the possibility that France would 
take advantage of the mistakes of its allies and precipitate its decision. 
In September, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville told 
Brosio that if the allies intended to use the Harmel Exercise to provoke 
a French reaction, the French government would accept the challenge. 
He added that he couldn’t guarantee his participation in the ministerial 
meeting in December, and stressed that his government had accepted the 
 TFE, MB, XXII,  June .
 Ibid., notes of  June,  June,  July,  July .
 Ibid.,  June .
 Ibid.,  August ;  September .
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Harmel Exercise “in a spirit of tolerance”, but that the results of the report 
were now being interpreted “in an inadmissible way”. Couve de Murville 
declared that NATO was a military and defensive alliance: “the quieter 
we stay, the better”. Brosio tried to convince him that Harmel harbored 
no anti-French sentiments; that his proposal had been aimed mainly at 
strengthening the alliance in the eyes of Western public opinion; that the 
purpose of the Exercise had been to reaffi  rm and develop the principles 
of consultation and coordination that were already included in the 1956 
document of the Th ree Wise Men. But Couve was not at all persuaded by 
these arguments. 71 
When Cleveland was informed by Brosio of Couve’s declarations, he 
reacted very sharply. He said that nobody in the US regarded the French as 
allies any longer, and that it would not matter at all if they left the alliance, 
since the remaining fourteen states agreed on the principle of the develop-
ment of détente. Brosio replied that the French, too, wanted to pursue a 
policy of détente and that, from this point of view, the choice of détente 
in itself did not constitute an element of division: the divergence related to 
the conditions of détente, and namely its eff ects on the German question. 
As for the danger of a German unilateral policy of détente, Brosio stressed 
that the US policy of détente was pushing the German government towards 
Moscow, and risked driving Germany out of the alliance.72
At the end of September 1967, the NATO secretary-general registered 
in his journal the attempts to postpone the conclusion of the Harmel 
Exercise in order to prevent a clash with Paris. He pointed out that the 
Germans might react, at the very least, with suspicion.73 After his mission 
to Bonn at the beginning of October 1967, Brosio was perfectly aware that 
the Germans did not want a showdown with the French. Bonn agreed 
that the fi nal report should emphasize the rapprochement between East 
and West, the policy of détente, and the monitoring of this process by the 
alliance, but requested that the document not specify the instruments by 
 Ibid.,  September .
 Ibid., 22 September 1967. On this aspect, see Helga Haftendorn, “Entstehung und Bedeutung”; 
ead., Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz: Die NATO-Krise von 1966–1967 (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1994).
 TFE, MB, XXII,  September .
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which such a control would be exercised.74 As for the French position, de 
Gaulle did not want a political strengthening of the alliance. 
Th e contradiction between these attitudes and the progress of the 
Harmel Exercise was evident. Th e Harmel proposal, Brosio argued, com-
pelled the allies to prove that NATO, in spite of its internal divisions, still 
retained its intimate raison d’être, and to show that the Atlantic commu-
nity, which had been established less than 20 years before, would survive the 
end of the Cold War and accept the challenge of détente without losing its 
essence. Th is was the message that the Atlantic governments wanted to send 
to their public constituencies. In Brosio’s opinion, the “original sin” of the 
Harmel proposal lay precisely in the fact that it aimed at bringing together 
actual facts and wishful thinking. On the one hand, the Harmel report 
had to show public opinion that NATO was a vital international forum 
where the reasons for unity prevailed over the elements of divergence; on 
the other hand, in the absence of a common strategy, the alliance member’s 
individual policies of détente and compromise with the Soviets provoked 
dangerous shocks, since every country based its attitude towards Moscow 
on its peculiar national interests. From this point of view, the French case 
was the most important and dangerous, but not the only one. 
In order to prevent a crisis between the fourteen remaining NATO 
members, who wanted the alliance to promote and control the whole 
process of détente, and France, which did not intend to give up its abso-
lute freedom of movement in relations towards the Soviet Union, Brosio 
envisaged only two alternatives: the fi rst was to try to concentrate the 
collective engagement on a “few well-determined issues”; the second was 
a commitment to consultations on all issues, which, however, would not 
involve any real commitment to a common policy.75 In November 1967, 
French Permanent Representative to NATO Roger Seydoux was fi rm on 
this point: he told Brosio that NATO was not an appropriate framework 
for the new policy of détente, and that the only problem was that the part-
ner governments didn’t have the nerve to tell their citizens this unpleas-
ant truth.76
 Ibid.,  October .
 Ibid., – October .
 Ibid.,  November 
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At this point, the work of the four sub-groups was over. Th e conclu-
sions of the four written reports had been reviewed and compared during a 
last meeting of the rapporteurs at Ditchley Park in October 1967. Based on 
the work of the sub-groups,77 a draft summary report was prepared by the 
International Staff  of the Secretariat in November. Th is report, presented 
to the foreign ministers in December, was approved on 14 December 1967 
and issued as an annex to the fi nal communiqué.78 Brosio confi ded to his 
journal that he distrusted the “insipid, reduced” text. But he also admitted 
that it off ered a twofold advantage: preventing a showdown with France 
and allowing the alliance to survive with a program that was “more or less 
illusory, but more or less decorous”.79 From this point of view, Brosio was 
forced to recognize that the outcome of the study was “modest, but less 
disastrous than [he] had foreseen”.80 In any case, if the Harmel Exercise 
was over, the task of the alliance had only just begun: in the years ahead, 
the fi fteen NATO members would have to demonstrate through their 
actions that “the alliance was a dynamic and vigorous organization,” that 
“the cohesion and solidarity of interest of its members” was not only a 
slogan for their public opinions and, last but not least, that it would play 
a major role in the promotion of détente. In other words, the time was 
coming to transform wishes into reality. 
 Th e full reports are available at http://www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel.htm.
 Th e Council’s report “Th e Future Tasks of the Alliance” is available at http://www.nato.int/
docu/comm/-/cb.htm.
 TFE, MB, XXII,  November 
 Ibid.,  November 
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Conclusion
In Brosio’s opinion, a policy of détente was dangerous, for a number of 
reasons, both to the Atlantic alliance and to Europe. He thought that the 
US viewed the Atlantic alliance mostly as an instrument for controlling 
Europe. Th e US search for an agreement with Moscow on a bilateral base 
was changing the nature of this arrangement. Would the Soviets accept 
it, in order to keep Europe weak and harmless? Brosio didn’t think so. He 
believed that Moscow wanted a divided and weak Europe, but under its 
own control, and that in the Soviet policy of détente, any agreement with 
Washington would represent only one stage in the process towards the 
“Soviet rule” over the continent.81
In addition to the dangers represented by the US and Soviet policies 
of détente, the perils of French foreign policy had to be taken into con-
sideration. De Gaulle did not want Great Britain to join the EEC, and 
he did not want the US to control Europe. He wanted Europe to reach 
an agreement with Moscow in order to control Germany. But the Europe 
“from the Atlantic to the Urals” that de Gaulle was building would be, 
in Brosio’s words, a continent “in Soviet hands”. Both France and the US 
were working on an agreement with Moscow at the expense of Germany, 
but the Soviets thought that only Washington could meet their require-
ments by ensuring that Germany remained harmless and under control. 
Th e alliance, Brosio wrote, faced with these dangers, was slowly losing its 
original features.82 
Brosio pointed out in no uncertain terms that both the US and France 
intended to use the demagogic impact of détente on public opinion in order 
to pursue a policy of compromise with the Soviets dictated by their own 
strategic interests, the purpose of which was an agreement with Moscow 
behind the back of the allies. 
Brosio’s skepticism about the Harmel proposal was due to the dema-
gogic character of the operation, which was mainly motivated by the 
necessity to demonstrate to Western public opinion that the alliance was 
“a dynamic and vigorous organization”, in spite of the diffi  culties it was 
 TFE, MB, XXI,  February .
 Ibid.,  July .
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facing; and by the fact that the relevance of the alliance and its raison d’être 
were themselves becoming subjects of discussion. Th ere was a risk that the 
whole experience would be reduced to a technical exercise, as it had not 
been made clear whether its aim was to precipitate a showdown with de 
Gaulle and to push France to leave the alliance, or to prevent Germany from 
searching a direct compromise with Moscow, or to establish Atlantic con-
trol over the policy of détente as a whole. In his concern about the French 
attitude, Brosio considered the Harmel Report a document of “wishful 
thinking” that would nevertheless allow the alliance to survive.
